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The Rational Basis of Legal Institutions. Vol. XI of the Legal Philosophy Series.
By various authors. Editorial preface by John H. Wigmore and Albert
Kocourek, and an introduction by Oliver Wendell Holmes. New York, The
Macmillan Company, 1923. pp. xxxii, 603.
If reviewing books were the judicial function that it ought to be, I should be
disqualified in this case. For as a member of the editorial committee of the Legal
Philosophy Series my advice as to the making of this book was asked and in some
cases followed. But as some of the notices of this book have been rather unjust
in failing to take account of what the editors actually set out to do, a review from
the latter point of view may be worth while.
The book is based on the assumption that it is very important that we should
consider the reason or justification for the fundamental legal institutions. Put
badly in this way, our assumption may sound like a truism the insistence on which
can hardly seem necessary at a time when there is an apparently general acceptance
of the idea that law is to be studied scientifically at a university and not as a mere
trade at a trade school. But in fact we have two parties in opposition to the idea
that the reason of the law is of any importance. In the first place there are the
old-fashioned conservatives, who hold that the law is a closed body of rules-rules
so definite that there is no use in theoretic discussion about them, since such discus-
sion cannot change them. But neither history nor logic bears out this view. We
know that the law has been constantly, if slowly, changing and that the reasons
which judges and jurists have given for various legal rules have influenced the
subsequent development (by the process of interpretation) of these rules. The
reasons found in the Federalist or those given by John Marshall in Marbury v.
Madison or in McCOloch v. Maryland have certainly been a determining factor in
the subsequent development of our constitutional law. The same people who assert
that law is law and has nothing to do with theory, generally rely confidently on
such dogmas as that that government is best which governs best, etc. This and a
host of other illustrations which will readily occur to any student of legal history
would make the conservative's position untenable, if he were not, in his contempt
for reason, reinforced (as conservatives generally are) by those who regard them-
selves as radicals, such as Marxians, positivists, behaviorists, and psycho-analysts.
All these, while differing markedly among each other as to the causes of legal
development, are united in the dogma that the reasons we give for any legal institu-
tion cannot possibly have any effective influence on its growth or administration.
But without denying that economic and organic motives have their place in the law
as in other fields of social life, it is rather easy to show that the dogmatic denial
of all influence to reason, that we can keep on professing certain reasons without
having them exert any influence, is just a snap judgment unsupported by serious
evidence from the realm of law and in fact inconsistent with the profession of
trying to improve its practice by better scientific teaching. For better or for worse
the reason or justification for the law of property, contract, etc., is under discussion
in the community at large; and the lawyer cannot ignore this or take the position
that all discussion is absolutely futile. He must appeal to general principles in his
defence of what he considers the legitimate iAterests *of property, personality, etc.
By reasoning also we tran'sform the law from an endless catalogue of bare rules,
remembered by r6te, into a~coherent system deducible from principles and therefore
more flexible and more easily adjustable to novel situations.
If the foregoing considerations have any merit, they show the necessity not only
for the general theory or 'philosophy of law, but more especially for books which
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will acquaint the students with the different influential views which have been
actually held as to the rational justification (or condemnation) of the various
fundamental legal institutions. To determine whether these reasons are sound or
not will of course involve knowledge of history, as well as of contemporary social
fact. But neither legal history nor contemporary social information can eliminate
the necessity of a juristic analysis of the fundamental aims at the basis of the
different legal institutions. Such an analysis is necessary, not only to determine
to what extent the law actually renders the service claimed for it, but is also
necessary for any coherent or' truly scientific development of the law that exists.
Indispensable as is a general textbook of the type of Dean Pound's "Introduction
to Legal Philosophy," there is need also of a source-book which should give the
different views as to the rationale of legal institutions in the words of their original
or most powerful proponents, and should follow as far as possible the manner in
which the law is generally split up in our law schools into a number of subjects
such as persons, contracts, civil wrongs, property, crime, procedure, etc.
This volume then is to be judged primarily as an effort at a new type of text
for students of law, occupying an intermediate position between the ordinary case-
books and treatises on the general theory of law. It shares with the latter the aim
of building up a general background against which the perspectives of various
legal rules can be more. justly estimated; but it shares with the casebook the
pedagogic advantage of offering no ready solutions but compelling the student to
weigh for himself the different contentions.
As to the manner in which Messrs. Wigmore and Kocourek have executed their
task' it is very easy to be censorious-in fact too easy, since we are involved here
in matters of judgment on which a wide diversity of opinion is possible. Thus
many selections seem to me perfectly valueless, containing nothing but common-
place opinions dressed'up in starched sociologic terminology. But possibly they
are for that reason all the more valuable, as being perfect specimens of their kind,
so plentiful nowadays. In any case I have no confidence that many more would
agree with my own selection from the enormous literature of this field. I venture
to think, however, that many of the needless repetitions in this volume could well
have been omitted to make room for appropriate extracts from judicial decisions
and other legal authorities to illustrate the way in which general social conceptions
do in fact enter into the matter of strictly legal issues. Even more confident am I
that it is an error to leave out the rationale of the institution of legal personality,
and, even more so, of legal procedure. The logic of mathematical and physical
science has made great progress by realizing that many fundamental principles or
axioms are really rules of procedure, and similar progress in legal science will be
blocked by too sharp a separation between substantive law and procedure.
Almost all the selections on property-which fill nearly 'half of the volume-
illustrate what philosophers call the fallacy of vicious abstraction. Property is
discussed as if it were just one simple thing existing by itself. In view of the
fact that almost everyone believes both (i) in some amount of government or limi-
tation on the right of individuals to do as they please, and (2) in some sphere of
individual freedom to dispose of things in accordance with our pleasure, the signifi-
cant question is not whether you are for or against private property, but rather
where you will draw the line between public and private things and affairs. May
there be private property in human beings (slavery), in public office, in the immoral
use of things (intoxicants, etc.) ? How far may a state expropriate an industry
by entering into competition with it, or how far may it use the power of taxation
to discourage undesirable enterprises? Questions of this sort are really more
significant as to the meaning of private property than abstract arguments such
1 On p. 28, 1. 6, obligatioans is a misprint for objections. On p. 32, Sidgwick is
made professor in 1833 though born in 1838.
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as the one (p. I8g) that private property is a guarantee of the desire for possession.
For obviously the institution of private property is also a thwarting of this desire
on the part of all who are not legal possessors. Indeed modern ownership of
capital really amounts to a right to tax those who wish to use certain tools. This
tax may be for the good of all in the long run, but the argument that such a system
sets examples of thrift sounds too ironic (p. 366). Another type of argument
which is singularly inconclusive is the one used by Mr. Paul Elmer More to the
effect that private property despite its cruelty is necessary to our civilization. It
might be replied that it begs the question as to whether a civilization that allows
certain cruel injustices is worth preserving.
Indeed, the overpowering impression which the reading of this book makes on
one interested in sound thinking, is the awful amount of nonsense written by
worthy people on serious and momentous subjects. The very first selection, from
Spencer, is based on a patent confusion between 'law of nature' as a uniformity of
existence and 'law of nature' as a norm of what ought to be. Obviously, if laws
of nature are absolute uniformities we cannot possibly violate them or act contrary
to them, and to condemn certain legislation as an interference with them (pp. 4 if.)
is absolute nonsense. Though this confusion has been repeatedly pointed out by
Huxley, Pearson and others, it continues to dominate popular thought. Nor is
the laboriously conscientious Mill free from this confusion between what is and
what ought to be (p. i6, end of sec. 2). But it is unnecessary to multiply examples.
All absolute statements such as Mill's "The despotism of custom is everywhere the
standing hindrance to human advancement," can be met by showing the equal truth
of the contrary, e. g.: "All human advancement depends on the mechanism of
habit or custom." It is only when through accurate factual knowledge we can
reduce our statements to precise quantitative form, that any proposition about
social life becomes more true than its contrary. So long as this is the case it
behooves tis to approach all these questions with profound humility and tolerance.
Meanwhile let us be thankful for a volume which contains such splendid and
illuminating essays as those of Roscoe Pound, L. K. McMurray, and Charmont.
They alone are well worth the price of the volume.
Momis R. CoHEx
New York City
Cases ois the Law of Bills and Notes. By William Everett Britton. Chicago,
Callaghan & Company, 1923. pp. vi, 938.
This is on the whole a satisfactofy casebook; it stands up under the test of
classroom use. Its immediately outstanding features are up-to-date cases-157 out
of 297 being on the N. I. L.; the inclusion of groups of N. L L. sections in
heavy-faced type in appropriate parts of the text; the inclusion of a list of States
and dates of adoption of the Act, and of references to a considerable body of
periodical literature; a set of annotations by quotations from other cases which
are admirably brief and well-chosen, and are of particular assistance where it
becomes desirable to skip cases without failing altogether to touch on the relative
points; and, finally, the segregation in Part II of some 29o pages of material on
the "Contractual Element" from which problems of negotiation and holders in due
course are as far as possible excluded. In the main the cases are well-chosen and
problem-raising rather than illustrative, although at times the compiler has slipped
in this regard. The material is as satisfactorily allotted as one man can expect
to find another's work to be; the compiler wisely refrained from including much
more than illustrative notes on such portions of the Act as unambiguously define
conditions of presentment for. payment and of notice. The collections of cases
on alteration, overdue paper, fictitious payees, and impersonation are especially
good. As is proper, procedure and presumptions are developed with some fullness,
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the difficulties of section 59 being the chief point on which more space seems
needed. More attention might well have been accorded such modern developments
as commercial letters of credit. But when this reviewer finds the generally
neglected drawer-drawee relation receiving such attention throughout the cases
as is accorded it by Professor Britton, he is little disposed to quarrel about
omissions.
The move to include the text of the Act among the assignments is welcome.
Professor Britton has not followed the arrangement of the Act, but has gathered
together such sections as seemed to him to bear upon any particular problem.
Occasionally, as where a section on sufficiency of presentment for payment is
included without warning under "What Constitutes Presentment for Acceptance,"
the instructor is apt to be startled; further thought leads to the belief that such
treatment challenges the student to comparison. It would do no harm to insert a
trick section in almost every set of sections from the Act. As to the wisdom of
thus grouping the Act's text where it seems to do most good, there may be
question. "We do not teach illiterates"; and we need to encourage individual
research into the statute. But if we insist on facing the facts of court decisions,
and cutting beneath the bark of phrases, it would seem to behoove us to do the
like with the facts of our own teaching. And he is a rare student who under
present conditions does with the Act what we want done; the drilled-in tendency
to look almost exclusively to the cases (and to those in the casebook), and the
inertia of ordinarily human students holds the bulk of most classes in its grip.
Putting the Text into the text helps. I should like to see the method varied, by
omissions and by giving notice of omissions; by deliberately misleading or irrele-
vant inclusions, to force thought, if such a thing be possible. But the compiler's
move remains welcome; and is convenient, as well, for the work in class.
The Part II already referred to deserves particular consideration. Its cases are
peculiarly well chosen to bring out the business situations underlying the problems.
Its only defect of which the reviewer would complain is that a wise move was not
carried to completion: how, for instance, can "the rights of the holder" be
fairly excluded from a discussion of the relations between immediate parties?
As this reviewer has already indicated (BooK REvrEws, 22 CoL. L. REV. 77o),
a course in commercial paper seems to him to center on the definition of the
normal obligations on that paper and in relation to it; it is in those obligations
that the essentials of the law of bills, notes and checks are to be found; it is in
their study that the uses and functions of the various kinds of paper appear.
Fixing one's dominant attention on the element of negotiability leads to a number
of what seem exceedingly undesirable results. In the first place, whether neces-
sarily or not, it has in fact led to thinking of "negotiable" as a term of unvarying
content. Yet it is clear that a holding that an instrument is a "negotiable note,"
so as to sustain a count in a complaint, or to raise a presumption of consideration,
or to make sections 14, 15, or 17 of the Act applicable, is by no means of necessity
a holding that the same instrument could be transferred in such manner as to
create a holder in due course; nor is the existence on its face of conditions, etc.,
forbidden by the N. I. L. conclusive that a bona fide purchaser cannot acquire all
the rights purporting to be carried by the document. In this connection the
negotiability element of bills and notes can and should be studied in conjunction
with the modern developments as to other commodity and credit paper. In the
second place, the fixing of attention on negotiability has tended to confine study to
those documents held negotiable, whereas the problem of the practitioner is, a good
part of the time: what are his client's rights, now that he is sure the document is
non-negotiable? What are they when this seeming check is drawn payable alterna-
tively at any one of three banks? Lastly, the emphasis on negotiability-though
again, perhaps, not of necessity-has tended to produce a lumping together of
checks, bills, short term notes, and investment paper which lamentably obscures
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their differences in function and the desirability of consequent differences in form
and, indeed, in rules. There is no reason, for instance, why stolen bearer bonds
should not pass to a holder in due course free of title-equities, even when they are
expressly on their face subject to the terms of a mortgage and even in law
subject to possible equities in favor of the maker. Professor Britton in his
Part II has made a good beginning toward a more solid treatment of the commer-
cial paper field. But material on non-negotiable paper one will as yet seek in the
casebooks in vain, and that is to be regretted; in notes, at least, sugkestions along
that line might be given without undue loss of space.
The reviewer's own preference for thinking of negotiability in terms of the sum
of those conditions which make possible the creation by transfer of all that the
paper calls for would lead him to differ somewhat from Professor Britton in
arrangement, putting much of the material now placed under "holder in due
course" under the first heading of the book, "operative facts of negotiability,"
which corresponds to the more usual heading "form"; and treating the balance
of material on holder in due course as conditions, other than form, on negotiability.
rather than as a "legal effect of negotiability"; for like reasons of definition the
reviewer would regard transfer not as a "legal effect of negotiability" but as a
situation where negotiability was immaterial (a scattering of real party in interest
cases notwithstanding). These differences are, however, of no moment save as
they bear on such a possible reworking of the whole commercial paper field as
the reviewer feels to be impending and called for.
A lack to be regretted is that of examples of the numberless as yet largely
unlitigated forms of instrument now current, and of the problems arising in their
use. Some day the inclusion of such material will be recognized as a vital part of
every casebook. Nor would it seem unreasonable to ask, ultimately, for notes
on the working of the rules in practice: the effect of metropolitan banking in
producing rather amazing numbers of irregular and probably ineffective protests,
for instance; or the absurdity of the rule that failure to give notice discharges,
regardless of loss suffered. After all, we are interested in the law not in the
books, but in action; and where the law-in-the-books gives but an imperfect view
of our objective, it must be supplemented.
KARu. NicKERsoN LLEWELLYN
Yale Law School
A Treatise on the Law of Corporations Having a Capital Stock. By William W.
Cook. Eighth Edition. Six Volumes. New York, Baker, Voorhis and Com-
pany, 1923. pp. C, 5936.
It is now thirty-six years since Mr. Cook presented his first work on corporate
law to the profession. The first book was limited in scope as compared with
later editions, since it dealt with the law of stock and stockholders instead of
The Law of Corporations having a Capital Stock, the title of the 8th edition just
off the press. This period is notable as having witnessed the phenomenal develop-
ment of corporation law. The decisions of the courts involving corporations
for this time vastly exceed in number all previous decisions of English and
American Courts on 'this subject.
Not only has corporate law grown in bulk, but it has been materially changed
in concept and scope, so that decisions of a decade ago even, have become
obsolete, and new theories of corporate personality and action are in process of
developing. Mr. Cook has been an activ and potent factor in this field. Suc-
cessive editions of his work have made him not merely a leading, but the lead-
ing authority with the bench and practicing bar, and no other book in this field
has been so frequently and favorably referred to by the courts. That the 8th
edition contains nearly eight times the number of pages found in the first edition
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is a striking illustration of the vast and increasing bulk of case law in this field
with which the student of associated action is compelled to deal. The author
has endeavored to include all the decisions of American courts of last resort.
In all these thousands of pages the text does not occupy on the average more
than one-half of the page. Considerably more than half the space is occupied
with long notes, collecting the cases. This treatise has been before the profes-
sion so long and has been so generally used that any extended comment on its
classification and style of treatment is superfluous.
The reader who expects to find in this treatise a critical and analytical dis-
cussion of the law of associated action will be disappointed. The ambition of
the author to present all the decisions is incompatible with such a treatment.
Wigmore in his treatise on Evidence has in a large measure attained it, but Mr.
Cook has not even tried.
The profession has found the earlier editions and will find this edition a vast
and never failing reservoir of precedent. It is a digest, yet it is something
more than a digest. The author has a certain gift of statement, if not of analysis,
which makes his text quotable. Decisions which have approved of the text of
former editions are referred to in great numbers in the notes, thus adding
mightily to the value of the text in the eyes of the practitioner in search of
authoritative material. The author does not permit himself the luxury of dis-
cussion on principle. His statements are always heavily fortified by notes.
The method of dealing with material throughout the work is fairly well indi-
cated by a quotation from Sec. 668 on ultra vires. "The attempt to formulate
general rules on this subject has only added to the confusion; accordingly the
plan of explanation pursued in this work is to state those acts which have been
adjudged ultra vires and also those acts which have been adjudged intra vires."
The eighth edition really represents the accretion on the seventh edition, made
by the decisions during the last ten years. The analysis is the same, and the
text for the most part the same. Chapter XXIX dealing with unincorporated
associations and Massachusetts trusts is new. Chapter XXX dealing with a
stockholder's right to inspect corporate books contains some new matter dealing
with unreasonable searches and examinations. Chapter XXIV dealing with the
taxation of shares of stock contains five new sections treating the more recent
federal and state legislation on corporate taxation. Chapter III on watered
stock contains some additional matter, particularly sec. 45d touching upon what
appears to be one of the author's pet aversions-non-par stock.
The sixth volume is devoted to forms, table of cases, and index. The forms,
i99 in number, appear to cover every conceivable situation from the inception
to the end of corporate life. The approved methods of intertwining corporations
in an almost inextricable mass that is driving courts to tug at, if not actually
to lift the corporate veil, are here set out. These forms are not the happy
inspiration of a printer, but the tried and true methods that have stood the shock
of court decision and practical administration in the business world. They are
all well worth the attention of the student of corporate law, as well as of the
lawyer searching for a way to accomplish his client's wishes.
These shells of things, neatly labelled and ready to wear, throw much light
on the life of the animal within. The table of cases is a veritable Niagara of
precedent flowing on in double column for 691 pages. If all the law is not here,
it ought to be. The index is well arranged and affords a fairly adequate guide
to the great mass of material. The work is obviously written for what the
author calls "the hard-headed lawyer" interested in finding material to support'
his clients' interests, and for that purpose it can not fail to serve its objective.
The student of corporations will not find in it the same joy. His task at least
is not so immediately practical. He is seeking to discover in this myriad of
precedent the signs of order and system. Is the law but a great jelly-like mass
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responding to every impulse from without, or has it a skeleton with definable
functions and limitations? To such a seeker the present work is but collected
raw material from which a form must be moulded, and a purpose found. The
author has not attempted the task which Morawetz and Taylor set for them-
selves in this subject, of examining critically the foundations of associated action,
which we call the law of corporations.
The preface is of interest since it is a dissertation on a number of topics
more or less related. Impressed and depressed by the "wilderness of precedent
and myriad of special instances," the author states that the crying need of the
profession is a comprehensive and practical treatise on all law similar in form
and style to the commentaries of Blackstone and Kent, which in his opinion so
admirably served their generation. Whether the proposed treatise shall be on
the science of law, philosophy of law or a comparison of law, the author pro-
fesses to be in doubt, though his comments on Holland and the school of analyti-
cal jurists show pretty clearly that he does not believe there is much hope in that
direction. To quote, "Even to the student of law this scientific view of the law
must be somewhat visionary. Certainty in the law is but a dream, whether
evolved from the scientific school, or the historical school, or the philosophical
school or all combined."
In his opinion the certainty of the civil law is nothing but evil since it has put
the law in a "straight jacket." The failure of the common law to define and
classify everything while it produces uncertainty is at once its glory and oppor-
tunity since it leaves the door open for growth to solve the new problems of
justice. "Justice, the supreme end, is undefined and undefinable. Science con-
tributes but is baffled when it comes to the growth of great moral forces."
A study of comparative law is his way out. Distrustful as he is of the various
schools of legal thought, he turns to the law schools as the final hope, when he
suggests that the best future law books will have to emanate from law school
professors. He also suggests four great juristic centers for the United States
with faculties of highly paid professors, who shall devote a major part of their
time to preparing treatises on various branches of the law, studying and working
out problems of the law and advising bar associations, legislative committees
and governors. Their duties as professors would be nominal, their real work
being, creative.
All of which means the conscious and systematic development of a philosophy
of the common law that will make possible an orderly and scientific development
of our legal system without the makeshifts and fictions by which our courts have
sought to escape the rigid bonds of form and precedent. The plea for a concise
and simple statement of the entire body of our law finds answer in the work
of the American Law Institute, which has that precise objective.
It is gratifying to find this distinguished fabricator of tools for a hard-headed
profession giving his indorsement to the law teachers and lawyers who are
striving to make our common law a more perfect instrument of justice.
HENRY SANGER RIcHARDS
Wisconsin University School of Law
De la Condition des Sociitgs gtrangres aux Etats-Unis d'Amirique. By Pierre
Lepaulle. Paris, Librairie Arthur Rousseau, Rousseau et Cie., 1923. pp.
lviii, 274-
The present volume, dealing with the condition of foreign corporations in the
United States, appears as the first of a series of monographs on Foreign Law,
Comparative Law, and International Law, to be published under the direction of
Professor Henry Lavy-Ullmann, of the University of Paris. The French jurists
have been leaders in the study of Comparative Law in the past. For many years
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courses in Comparative Law have been offered by the leading law faculties of
France, notably by the Ecole de Droit of Paris. Very important work in this
field has been done also by other bodies, for example, by the Soci~t6 de L6gisla-
tion Compar6e, which was founded more than fifty years ago. Since the close of
the Great War the French jurists have determined to carry on their work in the
field of Comparative Law on a still more comprehensive scale. Evidence of this
fact may be seen in Professor Lambert's Institute of Comparative Law at Lyons,
in the seminaries of Comparative Law created in the French law schools, in the
new review on Comparative Maritime Law, which is to consist of four volumes
a year and an additional supplementary volume, and in the series on Compara-
tive Law, of which the present is the initial volume. All these undertakings are
the expression of a desire to attain a better and a more scientific understanding
of the legal order of the world, and by so doing to prepare the way for more
intelligent and more uniform legislation.
M. Lepaulle is an advocate of the functional method in dealing with legal
problems (see his article on The Function of Comparative Law in 35 HARV. L.
REy. 838) and he approaches the subject of the condition of fbreign corporations
in the United States from that point of view. He inquires, therefore, not only
into the legal rules and provisions that are applicable in the various states to
foreign companies, but also into the social and economic forces behind the rules
and into the functioning of those rules in actual practice. For this reason he
studies with especial care the administrative machinery by which the rules and
regulations are put into effect and the manner of its operation in the various
states.
M. Lepaulle is a Doctor of Laws of the University of Paris and he has studied
for three years at the Harvard Law School. Thoroughly at home in the systems
of the civil and the common law, his observations regarding our law of foreign
corporations are both interesting and valuable. The work is written, of course,
primarily for French jurists, who are unacquainted with the American system of
law. In the nature of things, it contains, therefore, much that is elementary
to an American lawyer. He deals with the subject in all of its aspects in order
to present to the French reader an adequate picture of the American law applic-
able to foreign corporations.
A work dealing with such a difficult subject is naturally not wholly free from
imperfections. The author accepts, for example, without an examination into
its merits, the territorial theory of law in the discussion of the problems of the
Conflicts of Laws. Under the circumstances, this was perfectly natural. It is
regrettable, nevertheless, that he should have neglected to take advantage of the
opportunity afforded to inquire, by independent investigation, into the soundness
of the above theory. The work as a whole is, however, one of conspicuous
merit. It is a fine example of the functional method in the exposition of an
important topic in our law, and as such it may be highly recommended to the
American reader. It is written in a lucid style and can be easily understood by
all possessing a slight knowledge of the French language.
ERNEST G. LORENZEN
Yale Law School
The Law and Practice in Bankruptcy. By William Miller Collier. Thirteenth
Edition. By Frank B. Gilbert and Fred E. Rosbrook. Albany, Matthew
Bender & Company, 1923. 4 vols. pp. li, 4119.
The United States Bankruptcy Act was approved July 1, 1898. In September,
1898, appeared the original edition of Collier on Bankruptcy, intended, as its
author states, to "blaze the way" to a correct interpretation of the new statute.
During the succeeding twenty-five years thirteen editions of the work have been
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brought out. Most of these successive editions have been scarcely more than
reprints of the prior edition, with the addition, chiefly in the notes, of citations
to cases decided during the interval between editions. At last we have a really
new edition in which the editors have brought the text as well as the notes down
to date.
In this thirteenth edition much of the text seems to have been rewritten and
greatly improved. For example, in the chapter on Section 6o, which deals with
preferences, the introductory synopsis of the section has been reanalyzed, the
topical arrangement bettered, new material added, and the text considerably
expanded and clarified. Authoritative Supreme Court decisions, such for instance
as Carey v. Donohue (1916) 240 U. S. 43o, 36 Sup. Ct. 386, are taken note of in
the text and the discussion of what is meant by the statutory phrase "if recording
or registering is required" is made far clearer than in the earlier editions. Similar
improvements have been noted in other chapters which have been examined. No
change, however, in the general plan of treatment has been attempted. Each section
of the Act continues to be discussed in a chapter of its own. This arrangement is
believed to be the most convenient method of dealing with'a statutory subject such
as bankruptcy and is perhaps the chief reason for the popularity which Collier on
Bankruptcy has attained with practitioners.
The first'two volumes contain the treatise, the General Orders in Bankruptcy,
and a new feature consisting of a time table showing the time required for the
performance of the various steps in bankruptcy procedure. Volume three is
devoted to a very complete set of forms with annotations. The last volume con-
tains the Bankruptcy rules and the federal equity rules, all of the United States
Bankruptcy acts, the Canadian Act and a general index and table of cases. The
new edition is printed more legibly than the old.
In making so many changes and improvements in the text the editors of the
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